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AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF COVERED INTEREST 
ARBITRAGE MARGINS DURING THE EUROPEAN MONETARY CRISIS 
ossi Saarinen and Dr . Robert Leekley* , Dept . of Econ . , IWU 
Interest parity in international financial markets exists 
when the interest rate differential between two countries is 
exactly offset by the forward exchange premium/discount . If at 
any moment the interest parity condition is not satisfied, 
traders can execute covered interest arbitrage . Covered interest 
arbitrage entails a series of four transactions in the currency 
and securities markets which results in a practically riskless 
profit. Although traditional economic theory predicts that the 
opportunities will be wiped out as individuals take advantage of 
the s ituation, covered interest arbitrage margins (CIAMs ) have 
been observed to exist over extended periods of time . 
Previous research in the area has attempted to rectify the 
discrepancy by identifying factors outside the basic arbitrage 
equation which work to negate profit opportunities . The most 
dominant of such factors in the literature have been transaction 
costs , partly because they are quantifiable . Other factors , such 
as political/financial center risk, timing problems , and 
imperfect elasticities of demand and supply have been explored as 
wel l ,  but are more difficult to pin down empirically. 
My research attempts to show that transaction costs alone 
are not enough to explain away CIAMs . Rather, I wish to show that 
the political/financial center risk plays an important role in 
establishing effective interest parity . The focus is on the time 
period of summer 1 9 9 2 , when the European Monetary System crisis 
occurred , bringing along heavy speculation, volatility, and 
intervention in currency markets . A higher political/financial 
center risk for London is hypothesized to exist during this time 
period, producing margins that cannot be explained away by s imple 
transaction costs . To achieve our goal , weekly calculations of 
CIAMs are computed along with proxies for transaction costs . To 
expose pol itical/financial center risk, a traditional as well as 
a non-traditional pair of securities is used . It is hoped that 
data from the non-traditional pair coupled with transaction costs 
will explain a higher proportion of the observed CIAMs than the 
traditional pair/transaction costs combination, and thus reveal 
the importance of cons idering pol itical/financial center risk in 
establishing market efficiency . 
